#!/usr/bin/env python3

"""
Generates test cases that aim to validate name constraints and other
name-related parts of webpki.

Run this script from tests/.  It edits the bottom part of some .rs files and
drops testcase data into subdirectories as required.
"""

import argparse
import enum
import os
from typing import TextIO, Optional, Union, Any, Callable, Iterable, List
from pathlib import Path

from cryptography import x509
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa, ec, ed25519, padding
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import Encoding, PublicFormat
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
from cryptography.x509.oid import NameOID
import ipaddress
import datetime
import subprocess

ROOT_PRIVATE_KEY: rsa.RSAPrivateKey = rsa.generate_private_key(
    public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048, backend=default_backend()
)
ROOT_PUBLIC_KEY: rsa.RSAPublicKey = ROOT_PRIVATE_KEY.public_key()

NOT_BEFORE: datetime.datetime = datetime.datetime.utcfromtimestamp(0x1FEDF00D - 30)
NOT_AFTER: datetime.datetime = datetime.datetime.utcfromtimestamp(0x1FEDF00D + 30)

ANY_PRIV_KEY = Union[
    ed25519.Ed25519PrivateKey | ec.EllipticCurvePrivateKey | rsa.RSAPrivateKey
]
ANY_PUB_KEY = Union[
    ed25519.Ed25519PublicKey | ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey | rsa.RSAPublicKey
]
SIGNER = Callable[
    [Any, bytes], Any
]  # Note: a bit loosey-goosey here but good enough for tests.


def trim_top(file_name: str) -> TextIO:
    """
    Reads `file_name`, then writes lines up to a particular comment (the "top"
    of the file) back to it and returns the file object for further writing.
    """

    with open(file_name, "r") as f:
        top = f.readlines()
    top = top[: top.index("// DO NOT EDIT BELOW: generated by tests/generate.py\n") + 1]
    output = open(file_name, "w")
    for line in top:
        output.write(line)
    return output


def key_or_generate(key: Optional[ANY_PRIV_KEY] = None) -> ANY_PRIV_KEY:
    return (
        key
        if key is not None
        else rsa.generate_private_key(
            public_exponent=65537,
            key_size=2048,
            backend=default_backend(),
        )
    )


def write_der(path: str, content: bytes, force: bool) -> None:
    # Avoid churn from regenerating existing on-disk resources unless force is enabled.
    out_path = Path(path)
    if out_path.exists() and not force:
        return None

    with out_path.open("wb") as f:
        f.write(content)


def end_entity_cert(
    *,
    subject_name: x509.Name,
    issuer_name: x509.Name,
    issuer_key: Optional[ANY_PRIV_KEY] = None,
    subject_key: Optional[ANY_PRIV_KEY] = None,
    sans: Optional[Iterable[x509.GeneralName]] = None,
    ekus: Optional[Iterable[x509.ObjectIdentifier]] = None,
    serial: Optional[int] = None,
    cert_dps: Optional[x509.DistributionPoint] = None,
) -> x509.Certificate:
    subject_priv_key = key_or_generate(subject_key)
    subject_key_pub: ANY_PUB_KEY = subject_priv_key.public_key()

    ee_builder: x509.CertificateBuilder = x509.CertificateBuilder()
    ee_builder = ee_builder.subject_name(subject_name)
    ee_builder = ee_builder.issuer_name(issuer_name)
    ee_builder = ee_builder.not_valid_before(NOT_BEFORE)
    ee_builder = ee_builder.not_valid_after(NOT_AFTER)
    ee_builder = ee_builder.serial_number(
        x509.random_serial_number() if serial is None else serial
    )
    ee_builder = ee_builder.public_key(subject_key_pub)
    if sans:
        ee_builder = ee_builder.add_extension(
            x509.SubjectAlternativeName(sans), critical=False
        )
    if ekus:
        ee_builder = ee_builder.add_extension(
            x509.ExtendedKeyUsage(ekus), critical=False
        )
    if cert_dps:
        ee_builder = ee_builder.add_extension(
            x509.CRLDistributionPoints([cert_dps]), critical=False
        )
    ee_builder = ee_builder.add_extension(
        x509.BasicConstraints(ca=False, path_length=None),
        critical=True,
    )
    return ee_builder.sign(
        private_key=issuer_key if issuer_key is not None else ROOT_PRIVATE_KEY,
        algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
        backend=default_backend(),
    )


def subject_name_for_test(subject_cn: str, test_name: str) -> x509.Name:
    return x509.Name(
        [
            x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, subject_cn),
            x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.ORGANIZATION_NAME, test_name),
        ]
    )


def issuer_name_for_test(test_name: str) -> x509.Name:
    return x509.Name(
        [
            x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, "issuer.example.com"),
            x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.ORGANIZATION_NAME, test_name),
        ]
    )


def ca_cert(
    *,
    subject_name: x509.Name,
    subject_key: Optional[ANY_PRIV_KEY] = None,
    issuer_name: Optional[x509.Name] = None,
    issuer_key: Optional[ANY_PRIV_KEY] = None,
    permitted_subtrees: Optional[Iterable[x509.GeneralName]] = None,
    excluded_subtrees: Optional[Iterable[x509.GeneralName]] = None,
    key_usage: Optional[x509.KeyUsage] = None,
    cert_dps: Optional[x509.DistributionPoint] = None,
) -> x509.Certificate:
    subject_priv_key = key_or_generate(subject_key)
    subject_key_pub: ANY_PUB_KEY = subject_priv_key.public_key()

    ca_builder: x509.CertificateBuilder = x509.CertificateBuilder()
    ca_builder = ca_builder.subject_name(subject_name)
    ca_builder = ca_builder.issuer_name(issuer_name if issuer_name else subject_name)
    ca_builder = ca_builder.not_valid_before(NOT_BEFORE)
    ca_builder = ca_builder.not_valid_after(NOT_AFTER)
    ca_builder = ca_builder.serial_number(x509.random_serial_number())
    ca_builder = ca_builder.public_key(subject_key_pub)
    ca_builder = ca_builder.add_extension(
        x509.BasicConstraints(ca=True, path_length=None),
        critical=True,
    )
    if permitted_subtrees is not None or excluded_subtrees is not None:
        ca_builder = ca_builder.add_extension(
            x509.NameConstraints(permitted_subtrees, excluded_subtrees), critical=True
        )
    if key_usage is not None:
        ca_builder = ca_builder.add_extension(
            key_usage,
            critical=True,
        )
    if cert_dps:
        ca_builder = ca_builder.add_extension(
            x509.CRLDistributionPoints([cert_dps]), critical=False
        )

    return ca_builder.sign(
        private_key=issuer_key if issuer_key else subject_priv_key,
        algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
        backend=default_backend(),
    )


def generate_tls_server_cert_test(
    output: TextIO,
    test_name: str,
    expected_error: Optional[str] = None,
    subject_common_name: Optional[str] = None,
    extra_subject_names: Optional[List[x509.NameAttribute]] = None,
    valid_names: Optional[List[str]] = None,
    invalid_names: Optional[List[str]] = None,
    sans: Optional[Iterable[x509.GeneralName]] = None,
    permitted_subtrees: Optional[Iterable[x509.GeneralName]] = None,
    excluded_subtrees: Optional[Iterable[x509.GeneralName]] = None,
    force: bool = False,
) -> None:
    """
    Generate a test case, writing a rust '#[test]' function into
    tls_server_certs.rs, and writing supporting files into the current
    directory.

    - `test_name`: name of the test, must be a rust identifier.
    - `expected_error`: item in `webpki::Error` enum, expected error from
      webpki `verify_for_usage()` function.  Leave absent to
      expect success.
    - `subject_common_name`: optional string to put in end-entity certificate
      subject common name.
    - `extra_subject_names`: optional sequence of `x509.NameAttributes` to add
      to end-entity certificate subject.
    - `valid_names`: optional sequence of valid names that the end-entity
      certificate is expected to pass `verify_is_valid_for_subject_name` for.
    - `invalid_names`: optional sequence of invalid names that the end-entity
      certificate is expected to fail `verify_is_valid_for_subject_name` with
      `CertNotValidForName`.
    - `sans`: optional sequence of `x509.GeneralName`s that are the contents of
      the subjectAltNames extension.  If empty or not provided the end-entity
      certificate does not have a subjectAltName extension.
    - `permitted_subtrees`: optional sequence of `x509.GeneralName`s that are
      the `permittedSubtrees` contents of the `nameConstraints` extension.
      If this and `excluded_subtrees` are empty/absent then the end-entity
      certificate does not have a `nameConstraints` extension.
    - `excluded_subtrees`: optional sequence of `x509.GeneralName`s that are
      the `excludedSubtrees` contents of the `nameConstraints` extension.
      If this and `permitted_subtrees` are both empty/absent then the
      end-entity  certificate does not have a `nameConstraints` extension.
    """

    if invalid_names is None:
        invalid_names = []
    if valid_names is None:
        valid_names = []
    if extra_subject_names is None:
        extra_subject_names = []

    issuer_name: x509.Name = issuer_name_for_test(test_name)

    # end-entity
    ee_subject = x509.Name(
        (
            [x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, subject_common_name)]
            if subject_common_name
            else []
        )
        + [x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.ORGANIZATION_NAME, test_name)]
        + extra_subject_names
    )
    ee_certificate: x509.Certificate = end_entity_cert(
        subject_name=ee_subject,
        issuer_name=issuer_name,
        sans=sans,
    )

    output_dir: str = "tls_server_certs"
    ee_cert_path: str = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.ee.der")
    ca_cert_path: str = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.ca.der")

    if not os.path.isdir(output_dir):
        os.mkdir(output_dir)

    write_der(ee_cert_path, ee_certificate.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force)

    # issuer
    ca: x509.Certificate = ca_cert(
        subject_name=issuer_name,
        subject_key=ROOT_PRIVATE_KEY,
        permitted_subtrees=permitted_subtrees,
        excluded_subtrees=excluded_subtrees,
    )

    write_der(ca_cert_path, ca.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force)

    expected: str = ""
    if expected_error is None:
        expected = "Ok(())"
    else:
        expected = "Err(webpki::Error::" + expected_error + ")"

    valid_names_str: str = ", ".join('"' + name + '"' for name in valid_names)
    invalid_names_str: str = ", ".join('"' + name + '"' for name in invalid_names)
    presented_names_str: str = ""
    for san in sans if sans is not None else []:
        if presented_names_str:
            presented_names_str += ", "
        if isinstance(san, x509.DNSName):
            presented_names_str += f'"DnsName(\\"{san.value}\\")"'
        elif isinstance(san, x509.IPAddress):
            presented_names_str += f'"IpAddress({san.value})"'

    ip_addr_sans = all(isinstance(san, x509.IPAddress) for san in (sans or []))

    print(
        """
#[test]
fn %(test_name)s() {
    let ee = include_bytes!("%(ee_cert_path)s");
    let ca = include_bytes!("%(ca_cert_path)s");
    assert_eq!(
        check_cert(ee, ca, &[%(valid_names_str)s], &[%(invalid_names_str)s], &[%(presented_names_str)s]),
        %(expected)s
    );
}""" % locals(),
        file=output,
    )


def tls_server_certs(force: bool) -> None:
    with trim_top("tls_server_certs.rs") as output:
        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "no_name_constraints",
            subject_common_name="subject.example.com",
            valid_names=["dns.example.com"],
            invalid_names=["subject.example.com"],
            sans=[x509.DNSName("dns.example.com")],
        )

        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "additional_dns_labels",
            subject_common_name="subject.example.com",
            valid_names=["host1.example.com", "host2.example.com"],
            invalid_names=["subject.example.com"],
            sans=[x509.DNSName("host1.example.com"), x509.DNSName("host2.example.com")],
            permitted_subtrees=[x509.DNSName(".example.com")],
        )

        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "disallow_dns_san",
            expected_error="NameConstraintViolation",
            sans=[x509.DNSName("disallowed.example.com")],
            excluded_subtrees=[x509.DNSName("disallowed.example.com")],
        )

        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "allow_subject_common_name",
            subject_common_name="allowed.example.com",
            invalid_names=["allowed.example.com"],
            permitted_subtrees=[x509.DNSName("allowed.example.com")],
        )
        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "allow_dns_san",
            valid_names=["allowed.example.com"],
            sans=[x509.DNSName("allowed.example.com")],
            permitted_subtrees=[x509.DNSName("allowed.example.com")],
        )
        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "allow_dns_san_and_subject_common_name",
            valid_names=["allowed-san.example.com"],
            invalid_names=["allowed-cn.example.com"],
            sans=[x509.DNSName("allowed-san.example.com")],
            subject_common_name="allowed-cn.example.com",
            permitted_subtrees=[
                x509.DNSName("allowed-san.example.com"),
                x509.DNSName("allowed-cn.example.com"),
            ],
        )
        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "disallow_dns_san_and_allow_subject_common_name",
            expected_error="NameConstraintViolation",
            sans=[
                x509.DNSName("allowed-san.example.com"),
                x509.DNSName("disallowed-san.example.com"),
            ],
            subject_common_name="allowed-cn.example.com",
            permitted_subtrees=[
                x509.DNSName("allowed-san.example.com"),
                x509.DNSName("allowed-cn.example.com"),
            ],
            excluded_subtrees=[x509.DNSName("disallowed-san.example.com")],
        )

        # XXX: ideally this test case would be a negative one, because the name constraints
        # should apply to the subject name.
        # however, because we don't look at email addresses in subjects, it is accepted.
        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "we_incorrectly_ignore_name_constraints_on_name_in_subject",
            extra_subject_names=[
                x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.EMAIL_ADDRESS, "joe@notexample.com")
            ],
            permitted_subtrees=[x509.RFC822Name("example.com")],
        )

        # this does work, however, because we process all SANs
        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "reject_constraints_on_unimplemented_names",
            expected_error="NameConstraintViolation",
            sans=[x509.RFC822Name("joe@example.com")],
            permitted_subtrees=[x509.RFC822Name("example.com")],
        )

        # RFC5280 4.2.1.10:
        #   "If no name of the type is in the certificate,
        #    the certificate is acceptable."
        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "we_ignore_constraints_on_names_that_do_not_appear_in_cert",
            sans=[x509.DNSName("notexample.com")],
            valid_names=["notexample.com"],
            invalid_names=["example.com"],
            permitted_subtrees=[x509.RFC822Name("example.com")],
        )

        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "wildcard_san_accepted_if_in_subtree",
            sans=[x509.DNSName("*.example.com")],
            valid_names=["bob.example.com", "jane.example.com"],
            invalid_names=["example.com", "uh.oh.example.com"],
            permitted_subtrees=[x509.DNSName("example.com")],
        )

        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "wildcard_san_rejected_if_in_excluded_subtree",
            expected_error="NameConstraintViolation",
            sans=[x509.DNSName("*.example.com")],
            excluded_subtrees=[x509.DNSName("example.com")],
        )

        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "ip4_address_san_rejected_if_in_excluded_subtree",
            expected_error="NameConstraintViolation",
            sans=[x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_address("12.34.56.78"))],
            excluded_subtrees=[x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_network("12.34.56.0/24"))],
        )

        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "ip4_address_san_allowed_if_outside_excluded_subtree",
            valid_names=["12.34.56.78"],
            sans=[x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_address("12.34.56.78"))],
            excluded_subtrees=[x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_network("12.34.56.252/30"))],
        )

        sparse_net_addr = ipaddress.ip_network("12.34.56.78/24", strict=False)
        sparse_net_addr.netmask = ipaddress.ip_address("255.255.255.1")
        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "ip4_address_san_rejected_if_excluded_is_sparse_cidr_mask",
            expected_error="InvalidNetworkMaskConstraint",
            sans=[
                # inside excluded network, if netmask is allowed to be sparse
                x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_address("12.34.56.79")),
            ],
            excluded_subtrees=[x509.IPAddress(sparse_net_addr)],
        )

        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "ip4_address_san_allowed",
            valid_names=["12.34.56.78"],
            invalid_names=[
                "12.34.56.77",
                "12.34.56.79",
                "0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:ffff:0c22:384e",
            ],
            sans=[x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_address("12.34.56.78"))],
            permitted_subtrees=[x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_network("12.34.56.0/24"))],
        )

        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "ip6_address_san_rejected_if_in_excluded_subtree",
            expected_error="NameConstraintViolation",
            sans=[x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_address("2001:db8::1"))],
            excluded_subtrees=[x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_network("2001:db8::/48"))],
        )

        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "ip6_address_san_allowed_if_outside_excluded_subtree",
            valid_names=["2001:0db9:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0001"],
            sans=[x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_address("2001:db9::1"))],
            excluded_subtrees=[x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_network("2001:db8::/48"))],
        )

        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "ip6_address_san_allowed",
            valid_names=["2001:0db9:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0001"],
            invalid_names=["12.34.56.78"],
            sans=[x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_address("2001:db9::1"))],
            permitted_subtrees=[x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_network("2001:db9::/48"))],
        )

        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "ip46_mixed_address_san_allowed",
            valid_names=["12.34.56.78", "2001:0db9:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0001"],
            invalid_names=[
                "12.34.56.77",
                "12.34.56.79",
                "0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:ffff:0c22:384e",
            ],
            sans=[
                x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_address("12.34.56.78")),
                x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_address("2001:db9::1")),
            ],
            permitted_subtrees=[
                x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_network("12.34.56.0/24")),
                x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_network("2001:db9::/48")),
            ],
        )

        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "permit_directory_name_not_implemented",
            expected_error="NameConstraintViolation",
            permitted_subtrees=[
                x509.DirectoryName(
                    x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COUNTRY_NAME, "CN")])
                )
            ],
        )

        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "exclude_directory_name_not_implemented",
            expected_error="NameConstraintViolation",
            excluded_subtrees=[
                x509.DirectoryName(
                    x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COUNTRY_NAME, "CN")])
                )
            ],
        )

        generate_tls_server_cert_test(
            output,
            "invalid_dns_name_matching",
            valid_names=["dns.example.com"],
            subject_common_name="subject.example.com",
            sans=[
                x509.DNSName("{invalid}.example.com"),
                x509.DNSName("dns.example.com"),
            ],
        )


def signatures(force: bool) -> None:
    rsa_pub_exponent: int = 0x10001
    backend: Any = default_backend()
    all_key_types: dict[str, ANY_PRIV_KEY] = {
        "ed25519": ed25519.Ed25519PrivateKey.generate(),
        "ecdsa_p256": ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1(), backend),
        "ecdsa_p384": ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP384R1(), backend),
        "ecdsa_p521": ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP521R1(), backend),
        "rsa_1024_not_supported": rsa.generate_private_key(
            rsa_pub_exponent, 1024, backend
        ),
        "rsa_2048": rsa.generate_private_key(rsa_pub_exponent, 2048, backend),
        "rsa_3072": rsa.generate_private_key(rsa_pub_exponent, 3072, backend),
        "rsa_4096": rsa.generate_private_key(rsa_pub_exponent, 4096, backend),
    }

    feature_gates = {
        "ECDSA_P521_SHA256": 'all(not(feature = "ring"), feature = "aws-lc-rs")',
        "ECDSA_P521_SHA384": 'all(not(feature = "ring"), feature = "aws-lc-rs")',
        "ECDSA_P521_SHA512": 'all(not(feature = "ring"), feature = "aws-lc-rs")',
    }

    rsa_types: list[str] = [
        "RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA256",
        "RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA384",
        "RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA512",
        "RSA_PSS_2048_8192_SHA256_LEGACY_KEY",
        "RSA_PSS_2048_8192_SHA384_LEGACY_KEY",
        "RSA_PSS_2048_8192_SHA512_LEGACY_KEY",
    ]

    webpki_algs: dict[str, Iterable[str]] = {
        "ed25519": ["ED25519"],
        "ecdsa_p256": ["ECDSA_P256_SHA384", "ECDSA_P256_SHA256"],
        "ecdsa_p384": ["ECDSA_P384_SHA384", "ECDSA_P384_SHA256"],
        "ecdsa_p521": ["ECDSA_P521_SHA512", "ECDSA_P521_SHA256", "ECDSA_P521_SHA384"],
        "rsa_2048": rsa_types,
        "rsa_3072": rsa_types + ["RSA_PKCS1_3072_8192_SHA384"],
        "rsa_4096": rsa_types + ["RSA_PKCS1_3072_8192_SHA384"],
    }

    pss_sha256: padding.PSS = padding.PSS(
        mgf=padding.MGF1(hashes.SHA256()), salt_length=32
    )
    pss_sha384: padding.PSS = padding.PSS(
        mgf=padding.MGF1(hashes.SHA384()), salt_length=48
    )
    pss_sha512: padding.PSS = padding.PSS(
        mgf=padding.MGF1(hashes.SHA512()), salt_length=64
    )

    how_to_sign: dict[str, SIGNER] = {
        "ED25519": lambda key, message: key.sign(message),
        "ECDSA_P256_SHA256": lambda key, message: key.sign(
            message, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256())
        ),
        "ECDSA_P256_SHA384": lambda key, message: key.sign(
            message, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA384())
        ),
        "ECDSA_P384_SHA256": lambda key, message: key.sign(
            message, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256())
        ),
        "ECDSA_P384_SHA384": lambda key, message: key.sign(
            message, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA384())
        ),
        "ECDSA_P521_SHA256": lambda key, message: key.sign(
            message, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256())
        ),
        "ECDSA_P521_SHA384": lambda key, message: key.sign(
            message, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA384())
        ),
        "ECDSA_P521_SHA512": lambda key, message: key.sign(
            message, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA512())
        ),
        "RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA256": lambda key, message: key.sign(
            message, padding.PKCS1v15(), hashes.SHA256()
        ),
        "RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA384": lambda key, message: key.sign(
            message, padding.PKCS1v15(), hashes.SHA384()
        ),
        "RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA512": lambda key, message: key.sign(
            message, padding.PKCS1v15(), hashes.SHA512()
        ),
        "RSA_PKCS1_3072_8192_SHA384": lambda key, message: key.sign(
            message, padding.PKCS1v15(), hashes.SHA384()
        ),
        "RSA_PSS_2048_8192_SHA256_LEGACY_KEY": lambda key, message: key.sign(
            message, pss_sha256, hashes.SHA256()
        ),
        "RSA_PSS_2048_8192_SHA384_LEGACY_KEY": lambda key, message: key.sign(
            message, pss_sha384, hashes.SHA384()
        ),
        "RSA_PSS_2048_8192_SHA512_LEGACY_KEY": lambda key, message: key.sign(
            message, pss_sha512, hashes.SHA512()
        ),
    }

    output_dir: str = "signatures"
    if not os.path.isdir(output_dir):
        os.mkdir(output_dir)

    message = b"hello world!"
    message_path: str = os.path.join(output_dir, "message.bin")
    write_der(message_path, message, force)

    def _cert_path(cert_type: str) -> str:
        return os.path.join(output_dir, f"{cert_type}.ee.der")

    def _rpk_path(rpk_type: str) -> str:
        return os.path.join(output_dir, f"{rpk_type}.spki.der")

    for name, private_key in all_key_types.items():
        ee_subject = x509.Name(
            [x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.ORGANIZATION_NAME, name + " test")]
        )
        issuer_subject = x509.Name(
            [x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.ORGANIZATION_NAME, name + " issuer")]
        )
        certificate: x509.Certificate = end_entity_cert(
            subject_name=ee_subject,
            subject_key=private_key,
            issuer_name=issuer_subject,
        )

        rpk_pub_key = private_key.public_key().public_bytes(
            Encoding.DER, PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo
        )
        write_der(_rpk_path(name), rpk_pub_key, force)
        write_der(_cert_path(name), certificate.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force)

    def _test(
        test_name: str, cert_type: str, algorithm: str, signature: bytes, expected: str
    ) -> None:
        nonlocal message_path  # noqa: F824
        cert_path: str = _cert_path(cert_type)
        rpk_path: str = _rpk_path(cert_type)
        lower_test_name: str = test_name.lower()

        sig_path: str = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{lower_test_name}.sig.bin")
        write_der(sig_path, signature, force)
        feature_gate: str = feature_gates.get(algorithm, "")
        if feature_gate:
            feature_gate = f"#[cfg({feature_gate})]\n"

        print(
            """
#[test]
%(feature_gate)sfn %(lower_test_name)s() {
    let ee = include_bytes!("%(cert_path)s");
    let message = include_bytes!("%(message_path)s");
    let signature = include_bytes!("%(sig_path)s");
    assert_eq!(
        check_sig(ee, %(algorithm)s, message, signature),
        %(expected)s
    );
}""" % locals(),
            file=output,
        )

        print(
            """
#[test]
%(feature_gate)sfn %(lower_test_name)s_rpk() {
    let rpk = include_bytes!("%(rpk_path)s");
    let message = include_bytes!("%(message_path)s");
    let signature = include_bytes!("%(sig_path)s");
    assert_eq!(
        check_sig_rpk(rpk, %(algorithm)s, message, signature),
        %(expected)s
    );
}""" % locals(),
            file=output,
        )

    def good_signature(
        test_name: str, cert_type: str, algorithm: str, signer: SIGNER
    ) -> None:
        signature: bytes = signer(all_key_types[cert_type], message)
        _test(test_name, cert_type, algorithm, signature, expected="Ok(())")

    def good_signature_but_rejected(
        test_name: str, cert_type: str, algorithm: str, signer: SIGNER
    ) -> None:
        signature: bytes = signer(all_key_types[cert_type], message)
        _test(
            test_name,
            cert_type,
            algorithm,
            signature,
            expected="Err(webpki::Error::InvalidSignatureForPublicKey)",
        )

    def bad_signature(
        test_name: str, cert_type: str, algorithm: str, signer: SIGNER
    ) -> None:
        signature: bytes = signer(all_key_types[cert_type], message + b"?")
        _test(
            test_name,
            cert_type,
            algorithm,
            signature,
            expected="Err(webpki::Error::InvalidSignatureForPublicKey)",
        )

    def bad_algorithms_for_key(
        test_name: str, cert_type: str, unusable_algs: set[str]
    ) -> None:
        cert_path: str = _cert_path(cert_type)
        test_name_lower: str = test_name.lower()
        unusable_algs_str: str = ", ".join(alg for alg in sorted(unusable_algs))
        print(
            """
#[test]
fn %(test_name_lower)s() {
    let ee = include_bytes!("%(cert_path)s");
    for algorithm in &[ %(unusable_algs_str)s ] {
        assert!(matches!(
            check_sig(ee, *algorithm, b"", b""),
            Err(webpki::Error::UnsupportedSignatureAlgorithmForPublicKeyContext(_))
        ));
    }
}""" % locals(),
            file=output,
        )

    with trim_top("signatures.rs") as output:
        # compute all webpki algorithms covered by these tests
        all_webpki_algs: set[str] = set(
            [item for algs in webpki_algs.values() for item in algs]
        )

        for type, algs in webpki_algs.items():
            for alg in algs:
                signer: SIGNER = how_to_sign[alg]
                good_signature(
                    type + "_key_and_" + alg + "_good_signature",
                    cert_type=type,
                    algorithm=alg,
                    signer=signer,
                )
                bad_signature(
                    type + "_key_and_" + alg + "_detects_bad_signature",
                    cert_type=type,
                    algorithm=alg,
                    signer=signer,
                )

            unusable_algs = set(all_webpki_algs)
            for alg in algs:
                unusable_algs.remove(alg)

            # special case: tested separately below
            if type == "rsa_2048":
                unusable_algs.remove("RSA_PKCS1_3072_8192_SHA384")

            unusable_algs = {
                (
                    "#[cfg(%s)] %s" % (feature_gates[alg], alg)
                    if alg in feature_gates
                    else alg
                )
                for alg in unusable_algs
            }

            bad_algorithms_for_key(
                type + "_key_rejected_by_other_algorithms",
                cert_type=type,
                unusable_algs=unusable_algs,
            )

        good_signature_but_rejected(
            "rsa_2048_key_rejected_by_RSA_PKCS1_3072_8192_SHA384",
            cert_type="rsa_2048",
            algorithm="RSA_PKCS1_3072_8192_SHA384",
            signer=signer,
        )


def client_auth_revocation(force: bool) -> None:
    output_dir: str = "client_auth_revocation"
    if not os.path.isdir(output_dir):
        os.mkdir(output_dir)

    # KeyUsage for a CA that sets crl_sign.
    crl_sign_ku = x509.KeyUsage(
        digital_signature=True,
        key_cert_sign=True,
        crl_sign=True,  # NB: crl_sign set.
        content_commitment=False,
        key_encipherment=False,
        data_encipherment=False,
        key_agreement=False,
        encipher_only=False,
        decipher_only=False,
    )

    # KeyUsage for a CA that omits crl_sign.
    no_crl_sign_ku = x509.KeyUsage(
        digital_signature=True,
        key_cert_sign=True,
        crl_sign=False,  # NB: no crl_sign.
        content_commitment=False,
        key_encipherment=False,
        data_encipherment=False,
        key_agreement=False,
        encipher_only=False,
        decipher_only=False,
    )

    # Cert CRL distribution point. Contains at least one URI full name matching the valid_crl_idp.
    valid_cert_crl_dp = x509.DistributionPoint(
        full_name=[
            x509.DNSName("example.com"),
            x509.UniformResourceIdentifier("http://example.com/another.crl"),
            x509.UniformResourceIdentifier("http://example.com/valid.crl"),
        ],
        crl_issuer=None,
        relative_name=None,
        reasons=None,
    )
    # CRL issuing distribution point, contains at least one URI full name matching the valid_cert_crl_dp.
    valid_crl_idp = x509.IssuingDistributionPoint(
        full_name=[
            x509.UniformResourceIdentifier("http://example.com/yet.another.crl"),
            x509.UniformResourceIdentifier("http://example.com/valid.crl"),
        ],
        indirect_crl=False,
        only_contains_user_certs=False,
        only_contains_ca_certs=False,
        only_contains_attribute_certs=False,
        only_some_reasons=None,
        relative_name=None,
    )

    class ChainDepth(enum.Enum):
        END_ENTITY = enum.auto()
        CHAIN = enum.auto()

    class StatusRequirement(enum.Enum):
        ALLOW_UNKNOWN = enum.auto()
        FORBID_UNKNOWN = enum.auto()

    class ExpirationPolicy(enum.Enum):
        ENFORCE = enum.auto()
        IGNORE = enum.auto()

    def _chain(
        *,
        chain_name: str,
        key_usage: Optional[x509.KeyUsage],
        cert_dps: Optional[x509.DistributionPoint],
    ) -> list[tuple[x509.Certificate, str, ANY_PRIV_KEY]]:
        """
        Generate a short test certificate chain:
        ee -> intermediate -> root.

        :param chain_name: the name of the certificate chain. Used to generate subject/issuer names and to
        choose the filename to write DER contents to disk.

        :param key_usage: the KeyUsage to include in the issuer certificates (both the intermediate and the root).

        :param cert_dps: an optional CRL distribution point to include in each certificate.

        :return: Return a list comprising the chain starting from the end entity and ending at the root trust anchor.
        Each entry in the list is a tuple of three values: the x509.Certificate object, the path the DER encoding
        was written to, and lastly the corresponding private key.
        """

        ee_subj: x509.Name = subject_name_for_test("test.example.com", chain_name)
        int_a_subj: x509.Name = issuer_name_for_test(f"int.a.{chain_name}")
        int_b_subj: x509.Name = issuer_name_for_test(f"int.b.{chain_name}")
        ca_subj: x509.Name = issuer_name_for_test(f"ca.{chain_name}")
        ee_key: ec.EllipticCurvePrivateKey = ec.generate_private_key(
            ec.SECP256R1(), default_backend()
        )
        int_a_key: ec.EllipticCurvePrivateKey = ec.generate_private_key(
            ec.SECP256R1(), default_backend()
        )
        int_b_key: ec.EllipticCurvePrivateKey = ec.generate_private_key(
            ec.SECP256R1(), default_backend()
        )
        root_key: ec.EllipticCurvePrivateKey = ec.generate_private_key(
            ec.SECP256R1(), default_backend()
        )

        # EE cert issued by intermediate.
        ee_cert: x509.Certificate = end_entity_cert(
            subject_name=ee_subj,
            issuer_name=int_a_subj,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
            cert_dps=cert_dps,
        )
        ee_cert_path: str = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{chain_name}.ee.der")
        write_der(ee_cert_path, ee_cert.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force)

        # Second EE cert issued by intermediate, with top-bit set in serial.
        ee_cert_topbit: x509.Certificate = end_entity_cert(
            subject_name=ee_subj,
            issuer_name=int_a_subj,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
            serial=0x80DEADBEEFF00D,
            cert_dps=cert_dps,
        )
        ee_cert_topbit_path: str = os.path.join(
            output_dir, f"{chain_name}.topbit.ee.der"
        )
        write_der(ee_cert_topbit_path, ee_cert_topbit.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force)

        # intermediate a cert issued by intermediate b.
        int_a_cert: x509.Certificate = ca_cert(
            subject_name=int_a_subj,
            subject_key=int_a_key,
            issuer_name=int_b_subj,
            issuer_key=int_b_key,
            key_usage=key_usage,
            cert_dps=cert_dps,
        )
        int_a_cert_path: str = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{chain_name}.int.a.ca.der")
        write_der(int_a_cert_path, int_a_cert.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force)

        # intermediate b cert issued by root cert.
        int_b_cert: x509.Certificate = ca_cert(
            subject_name=int_b_subj,
            subject_key=int_b_key,
            issuer_name=ca_subj,
            issuer_key=root_key,
            key_usage=key_usage,
            cert_dps=cert_dps,
        )
        int_b_cert_path: str = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{chain_name}.int.b.ca.der")
        write_der(int_b_cert_path, int_b_cert.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force)

        # root cert issued by itself.
        root_cert: x509.Certificate = ca_cert(
            subject_name=ca_subj,
            subject_key=root_key,
            key_usage=key_usage,
            cert_dps=cert_dps,
        )
        root_cert_path: str = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{chain_name}.root.ca.der")
        write_der(root_cert_path, root_cert.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force)

        return [
            (ee_cert, ee_cert_path, ee_key),
            (int_a_cert, int_a_cert_path, int_a_key),
            (int_b_cert, int_b_cert_path, int_b_key),
            (root_cert, root_cert_path, root_key),
            (ee_cert_topbit, ee_cert_topbit_path, ee_key),
        ]

    def _crl(
        *,
        serials: Iterable[int],
        issuer_name: x509.Name,
        issuer_key: Optional[ANY_PRIV_KEY],
        issuing_dp: Optional[x509.IssuingDistributionPoint] = None,
        not_after: Optional[datetime.datetime] = None,
    ) -> x509.CertificateRevocationList:
        """
        Generate a certificate revocation list.
        :param serials: list of serial numbers to include in the CRL as revoked certificates.
        :param issuer_name: the name of the CRL issuer.
        :param issuer_key: the key used to sign the CRL.
        :param issuing_dp: an optional CRL issuing distribution point extension to include.
        :return: a generated x509.CertificateRevocationList.
        """
        issuer_priv_key: ANY_PRIV_KEY = key_or_generate(issuer_key)
        crl_builder: x509.CertificateRevocationListBuilder = (
            x509.CertificateRevocationListBuilder()
        )
        crl_builder = crl_builder.issuer_name(issuer_name)
        crl_builder = crl_builder.last_update(NOT_BEFORE)
        if not_after is None:
            not_after = NOT_AFTER
        crl_builder = crl_builder.next_update(not_after)
        for serial in serials:
            revoked_cert_builder: x509.RevokedCertificateBuilder = (
                x509.RevokedCertificateBuilder()
            )
            revoked_cert_builder = revoked_cert_builder.serial_number(serial)
            revoked_cert_builder = revoked_cert_builder.revocation_date(NOT_BEFORE)
            revoked_cert_builder = revoked_cert_builder.add_extension(
                x509.CRLReason(x509.ReasonFlags.key_compromise), critical=False
            )
            crl_builder = crl_builder.add_revoked_certificate(
                revoked_cert_builder.build()
            )
        if issuing_dp is not None:
            crl_builder = crl_builder.add_extension(issuing_dp, critical=True)
        crl_builder = crl_builder.add_extension(
            x509.CRLNumber(x509.random_serial_number()), critical=False
        )

        return crl_builder.sign(
            private_key=issuer_priv_key,
            algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
        )

    def _revocation_test(
        *,
        test_name: str,
        chain: list[tuple[x509.Certificate, str, ANY_PRIV_KEY]],
        crl_paths: list[str],
        depth: ChainDepth,
        policy: StatusRequirement,
        expiration: ExpirationPolicy,
        expected_error: Optional[str],
        ee_topbit_serial: bool = False,
    ) -> None:
        """
        Generate a Rust unit test for a revocation checking scenario and write it to the output file.

        :param test_name: the name of the unit test.
        :param chain: the certificate chain to use for validation.
        :param crl_paths: paths to zero or more CRLs.
        :param depth: revocation checking depth.
        :param policy: unknown revocation status policy.
        :param expected_error: an optional error to expect to be returned from validation.
        :param ee_topbit_serial: whether to use an ee cert with or without a serial with the top bit set.
        """
        if len(chain) != 5:
            raise RuntimeError("invalid chain length")

        ee_cert, ee_cert_path, _ = chain[4] if ee_topbit_serial else chain[0]
        int_a_cert, int_a_cert_path, _ = chain[1]
        int_b_cert, int_b_cert_path, _ = chain[2]
        root_cert, root_cert_path, _ = chain[3]

        int_a_str = f'include_bytes!("{int_a_cert_path}").as_slice()'
        int_b_str = f'include_bytes!("{int_b_cert_path}").as_slice()'
        intermediates_str: str = f"&[{int_a_str}, {int_b_str}]"

        def _write_revocation_test(*, owned: bool) -> None:
            nonlocal crl_paths, expected_error, intermediates_str, test_name, ee_cert_path, root_cert_path  # noqa: F824

            test_name = test_name if not owned else test_name + "_owned"

            crl_includes: str = ""
            if not owned:
                crl_includes = "\n".join([f"""
                        &webpki::CertRevocationList::Borrowed(
                          webpki::BorrowedCertRevocationList::from_der(include_bytes!("{path}").as_slice())
                          .unwrap()
                        ),
                        """ for path in crl_paths])
            else:
                crl_includes = "\n".join([f"""
                        &webpki::CertRevocationList::Owned(
                          webpki::OwnedCertRevocationList::from_der(include_bytes!("{path}").as_slice())
                          .unwrap()
                        ),
                        """ for path in crl_paths])

            if len(crl_paths) == 0:
                revocation_setup = "let revocation = None;"
            else:
                revocation_setup = f"""
                let crls = &[{crl_includes}];
                let builder = RevocationOptionsBuilder::new(crls).unwrap();
                """
                if depth == ChainDepth.END_ENTITY:
                    revocation_setup += """
                    let builder = builder.with_depth(RevocationCheckDepth::EndEntity);
                    """
                if policy == StatusRequirement.ALLOW_UNKNOWN:
                    revocation_setup += """
                    let builder = builder.with_status_policy(UnknownStatusPolicy::Allow);
                    """
                if expiration == ExpirationPolicy.ENFORCE:
                    revocation_setup += """
                    let builder = builder.with_expiration_policy(webpki::ExpirationPolicy::Enforce);
                    """
                revocation_setup += "let revocation = Some(builder.build());"

            expected: str = (
                f"Err(webpki::Error::{expected_error})" if expected_error else "Ok(())"
            )
            feature_gate = '#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]' if owned else ""

            print(
                """
            %(feature_gate)s
            #[test]
            fn %(test_name)s() {
              let ee = include_bytes!("%(ee_cert_path)s");
              let intermediates = %(intermediates_str)s;
              let ca = include_bytes!("%(root_cert_path)s");
              %(revocation_setup)s
              assert_eq!(check_cert(ee, intermediates, ca, revocation), %(expected)s);
            }
            """ % locals(),
                file=output,
            )

        # Create test cases for both the owned and borrowed representations.
        _write_revocation_test(owned=False)
        _write_revocation_test(owned=True)

    # Build a simple certificate chain where the issuers don't have a key usage specified.
    no_ku_chain = _chain(chain_name="no_ku_chain", key_usage=None, cert_dps=None)

    # Build a simple certificate chain where the issuers have key usage specified, but don't include the
    # cRLSign bit.
    no_crl_ku_chain = _chain(
        chain_name="no_crl_ku_chain", key_usage=no_crl_sign_ku, cert_dps=None
    )

    # Build a simple certificate chain where the issuers have key usage specified, and include the cRLSign bit.
    crl_ku_chain = _chain(chain_name="ku_chain", key_usage=crl_sign_ku, cert_dps=None)

    # Build a certificate chain where each certificate has a CRL distribution point ext.
    dp_chain = _chain(chain_name="dp_chain", key_usage=None, cert_dps=valid_cert_crl_dp)

    def _ee_no_crls_test() -> None:
        # Providing no CRLs means the EE cert should verify without err.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name="no_crls_test",
            chain=no_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[],
            depth=ChainDepth.END_ENTITY,  # unused
            policy=StatusRequirement.ALLOW_UNKNOWN,  # unused
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error=None,
        )

    def _no_relevant_crl_ee_depth_allow_unknown() -> None:
        test_name = "no_relevant_crl_ee_depth_allow_unknown"
        # Generate a CRL that includes the EE cert's serial, but that is issued by an unknown issuer.
        ee_cert = no_ku_chain[0][0]
        no_match_crl = _crl(
            serials=[ee_cert.serial_number],
            issuer_name=subject_name_for_test("whatev", test_name),
            issuer_key=None,
        )
        no_match_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(no_match_crl_path, no_match_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force)

        # Providing no relevant CRL and allowing unknown status
        # means the EE cert should verify without err.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=no_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[no_match_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.END_ENTITY,
            policy=StatusRequirement.ALLOW_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error=None,
        )

    def _no_relevant_crl_ee_depth_forbid_unknown() -> None:
        test_name = "no_relevant_crl_ee_depth_forbid_unknown"
        # Generate a CRL that includes the EE cert's serial, but that is issued by an unknown issuer.
        ee_cert = no_ku_chain[0][0]
        no_match_crl = _crl(
            serials=[ee_cert.serial_number],
            issuer_name=subject_name_for_test("whatev", test_name),
            issuer_key=None,
        )
        no_match_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(no_match_crl_path, no_match_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force)

        # Providing no relevant CRL and forbidding unknown status
        # means the EE cert should not verify.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=no_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[no_match_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.END_ENTITY,
            policy=StatusRequirement.FORBID_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error="UnknownRevocationStatus",
        )

    def _ee_not_revoked_ee_depth() -> None:
        test_name = "ee_not_revoked_ee_depth"
        ee_cert = no_ku_chain[0][0]
        int_a_key = no_ku_chain[1][2]
        # Generate a CRL that doesn't include the EE cert's serial, but that is issued by the same issuer.
        ee_not_revoked_crl = _crl(
            serials=[12345],  # Some serial that isn't the ee_cert.serial.
            issuer_name=ee_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
        )
        ee_not_revoked_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(
            ee_not_revoked_crl_path,
            ee_not_revoked_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER),
            force,
        )

        # Providing a CRL that's relevant and verifies, but that doesn't include the EE cert serial should verify
        # without err.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=no_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[ee_not_revoked_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.END_ENTITY,
            policy=StatusRequirement.ALLOW_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error=None,
        )

    def _ee_not_revoked_chain_depth() -> None:
        test_name = "ee_not_revoked_chain_depth"
        ee_cert = no_ku_chain[0][0]
        int_a_key = no_ku_chain[1][2]
        # Generate a CRL that doesn't include the EE cert's serial, but that is issued by the same issuer.
        ee_not_revoked_crl = _crl(
            serials=[12345],  # Some serial that isn't the ee_cert.serial.
            issuer_name=ee_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
        )
        ee_not_revoked_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(
            ee_not_revoked_crl_path,
            ee_not_revoked_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER),
            force,
        )

        # Providing a CRL that's relevant and verifies, but that doesn't include the EE cert serial should verify
        # without err when using chain depth. The intermediates will be considered unknown revocation status, but
        # we allow that so there is no overall error.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=no_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[ee_not_revoked_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.CHAIN,
            policy=StatusRequirement.ALLOW_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error=None,
        )

    def _ee_revoked_badsig_ee_depth() -> None:
        test_name = "ee_revoked_badsig_ee_depth"
        ee_cert = no_ku_chain[0][0]
        # Generate a CRL that includes the EE cert's serial, and that is issued the same issuer, but that
        # has an invalid signature.
        rand_key: ec.EllipticCurvePrivateKey = ec.generate_private_key(
            ec.SECP256R1(), default_backend()
        )
        ee_revoked_badsig = _crl(
            serials=[ee_cert.serial_number],
            issuer_name=ee_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=rand_key,  # NB: Using a random key to sign, not int_a_key.
        )
        ee_revoked_badsig_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(
            ee_revoked_badsig_path, ee_revoked_badsig.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force
        )

        # Providing a relevant CRL that includes the EE cert serial but does not verify should error.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=no_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[ee_revoked_badsig_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.END_ENTITY,
            policy=StatusRequirement.ALLOW_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error="InvalidCrlSignatureForPublicKey",
        )

    def _ee_revoked_wrong_ku_ee_depth() -> None:
        test_name = "ee_revoked_wrong_ku_ee_depth"
        ee_cert = no_crl_ku_chain[0][0]
        int_a_key = no_crl_ku_chain[1][2]
        # Generate a CRL that includes the EE cert's serial, and that is issued by the same issuer (with a KU specified
        # but no cRLSign bit)
        ee_revoked_crl = _crl(
            serials=[ee_cert.serial_number],
            issuer_name=ee_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
        )
        ee_revoked_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(ee_revoked_crl_path, ee_revoked_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force)

        # Providing a relevant CRL that includes the EE cert serial but was issued by a CA that has a KU specified
        # that doesn't include cRLSign should error indicating the CRL issuer can't sign CRLs.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=no_crl_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[ee_revoked_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.END_ENTITY,
            policy=StatusRequirement.ALLOW_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error="IssuerNotCrlSigner",
        )

    def _ee_not_revoked_wrong_ku_ee_depth() -> None:
        test_name = "ee_not_revoked_wrong_ku_ee_depth"
        ee_cert = no_crl_ku_chain[0][0]
        int_a_key = no_crl_ku_chain[1][2]
        # Generate a CRL that doesn't include the EE cert's serial, but that is issued by the same issuer.
        ee_not_revoked_crl = _crl(
            serials=[12345],  # Some serial that isn't the ee_cert.serial.
            issuer_name=ee_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
        )
        ee_not_revoked_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(
            ee_not_revoked_crl_path,
            ee_not_revoked_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER),
            force,
        )

        # Providing a relevant CRL that includes the EE cert serial but was issued by a CA that has a KU specified
        # that doesn't include cRLSign should error indicating the CRL issuer can't sign CRLs.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=no_crl_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[ee_not_revoked_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.END_ENTITY,
            policy=StatusRequirement.ALLOW_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error="IssuerNotCrlSigner",
        )

    def _ee_revoked_no_ku_ee_depth() -> None:
        test_name = "ee_revoked_no_ku_ee_depth"
        ee_cert = no_ku_chain[0][0]
        int_a_key = no_ku_chain[1][2]
        # Generate a CRL that includes the EE cert's serial, and that is issued by the same issuer (without any KU
        # specified).
        ee_revoked_crl = _crl(
            serials=[ee_cert.serial_number],
            issuer_name=ee_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
        )
        ee_revoked_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(ee_revoked_crl_path, ee_revoked_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force)

        # Providing a relevant CRL that includes the EE cert serial and verifies should error indicating the cert
        # was revoked.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=no_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[ee_revoked_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.END_ENTITY,
            policy=StatusRequirement.ALLOW_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error="CertRevoked",
        )

    def _ee_revoked_crl_ku_ee_depth() -> None:
        test_name = "ee_revoked_crl_ku_ee_depth"
        ee_cert = crl_ku_chain[0][0]
        int_a_key = crl_ku_chain[1][2]
        # Generate a CRL that includes the EE cert's serial, and that is issued by the same issuer (with a KU
        # specified that includes cRLSign).
        ee_revoked_crl = _crl(
            serials=[ee_cert.serial_number],
            issuer_name=ee_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
        )
        ee_revoked_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(ee_revoked_crl_path, ee_revoked_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force)

        # Providing a relevant CRL that includes the EE cert serial and verifies should error indicating the cert
        # was revoked.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=crl_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[ee_revoked_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.END_ENTITY,
            policy=StatusRequirement.ALLOW_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error="CertRevoked",
        )

    def _no_crls_test_chain_depth() -> None:
        # Providing no CRLs means the chain should verify without err.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name="no_crls_test_chain_depth",
            chain=no_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[],
            depth=ChainDepth.CHAIN,  # unused
            policy=StatusRequirement.ALLOW_UNKNOWN,  # unused
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error=None,
        )

    def _no_relevant_crl_chain_depth_allow_unknown() -> None:
        test_name = "no_relevant_crl_chain_depth_allow_unknown"
        # Generate a CRL that includes the first intermediate cert's serial, but that is issued by an unknown issuer.
        int_a_cert = no_ku_chain[1][0]
        no_match_crl = _crl(
            serials=[int_a_cert.serial_number],
            issuer_name=subject_name_for_test("whatev", test_name),
            issuer_key=None,
        )
        no_match_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(no_match_crl_path, no_match_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force)

        # Providing no relevant CRL, and allowing unknown status, means the chain should verify without err.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=no_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[no_match_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.CHAIN,
            policy=StatusRequirement.ALLOW_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error=None,
        )

    def _no_relevant_crl_chain_depth_forbid_unknown() -> None:
        test_name = "no_relevant_crl_chain_depth_forbid_unknown"
        # Generate a CRL that includes the first intermediate cert's serial, but that is issued by an unknown issuer.
        int_a_cert = no_ku_chain[1][0]
        no_match_crl = _crl(
            serials=[int_a_cert.serial_number],
            issuer_name=subject_name_for_test("whatev", test_name),
            issuer_key=None,
        )
        no_match_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(no_match_crl_path, no_match_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force)

        # Providing no relevant CRL, and forbidding unknown status, means the chain should not verify.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=no_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[no_match_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.CHAIN,
            policy=StatusRequirement.FORBID_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error="UnknownRevocationStatus",
        )

    def _int_not_revoked_chain_depth_allow_unknown() -> None:
        test_name = "int_not_revoked_chain_depth"
        int_a_cert = no_ku_chain[1][0]
        int_b_key = no_ku_chain[2][2]
        # Generate a CRL that doesn't include the intermediate A cert's serial, but that is issued by the same issuer.
        int_not_revoked_crl = _crl(
            serials=[12345],  # Some serial that isn't the int_a_cert.serial.
            issuer_name=int_a_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_b_key,
        )
        int_not_revoked_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(
            int_not_revoked_crl_path,
            int_not_revoked_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER),
            force,
        )

        # Providing a CRL that's relevant and verifies, but that doesn't include the intermediate cert serial should
        # verify the chain without err.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=no_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[int_not_revoked_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.CHAIN,
            policy=StatusRequirement.ALLOW_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error=None,
        )

    def _int_not_revoked_chain_depth_forbid_unknown() -> None:
        test_name = "int_not_revoked_chain_depth_forbid_unknown"
        ee_cert = no_ku_chain[0][0]
        int_a_cert = no_ku_chain[1][0]
        int_a_key = no_ku_chain[1][2]
        int_b_key = no_ku_chain[2][2]
        int_b_cert = no_ku_chain[2][0]
        root_key = no_ku_chain[3][2]

        # Generate a CRL that doesn't include the EE cert's serial, but that is issued by the same issuer.
        ee_not_revoked_crl = _crl(
            serials=[9999],
            issuer_name=ee_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
        )
        ee_not_revoked_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}_ee.crl.der")
        write_der(
            ee_not_revoked_crl_path,
            ee_not_revoked_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER),
            force,
        )
        # Generate a CRL that doesn't include the intermediate A cert's serial, but that is issued by the same issuer.
        int_not_revoked_crl = _crl(
            serials=[12345],  # Some serial that isn't the int_a_cert.serial.
            issuer_name=int_a_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_b_key,
        )
        int_not_revoked_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(
            int_not_revoked_crl_path,
            int_not_revoked_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER),
            force,
        )
        # Generate a CRL that doesn't include the intermediate B cert's serial, but that is issued by the same issuer.
        int_not_revoked_crl_b = _crl(
            serials=[12345],  # Some serial that isn't the int_b_cert.serial.
            issuer_name=int_b_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=root_key,
        )
        int_not_revoked_crl_b_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}_b.crl.der")
        write_der(
            int_not_revoked_crl_b_path,
            int_not_revoked_crl_b.public_bytes(Encoding.DER),
            force,
        )

        # Providing a CRL that's relevant and verifies, but that doesn't include the intermediate cert serial should
        # verify the chain without err.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=no_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[
                ee_not_revoked_crl_path,
                int_not_revoked_crl_path,
                int_not_revoked_crl_b_path,
            ],
            depth=ChainDepth.CHAIN,
            policy=StatusRequirement.FORBID_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error=None,
        )

    def _int_revoked_badsig_chain_depth() -> None:
        test_name = "int_revoked_badsig_chain_depth"
        int_a_cert = no_ku_chain[1][0]
        # Generate a CRL that includes the intermediate cert's serial, and that is issued the same issuer, but that
        # has an invalid signature.
        rand_key: ec.EllipticCurvePrivateKey = ec.generate_private_key(
            ec.SECP256R1(), default_backend()
        )
        int_revoked_badsig = _crl(
            serials=[int_a_cert.serial_number],
            issuer_name=int_a_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=rand_key,  # NB: Using a random key to sign, not CA cert's key.
        )
        int_revoked_badsig_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(
            int_revoked_badsig_path,
            int_revoked_badsig.public_bytes(Encoding.DER),
            force,
        )

        # Providing a relevant CRL that includes the intermediate cert's serial but does not verify should error.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=no_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[int_revoked_badsig_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.CHAIN,
            policy=StatusRequirement.ALLOW_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error="InvalidCrlSignatureForPublicKey",
        )

    def _int_revoked_wrong_ku_chain_depth() -> None:
        test_name = "int_revoked_wrong_ku_chain_depth"
        int_a_cert = no_crl_ku_chain[1][0]
        int_b_key = no_crl_ku_chain[2][2]
        # Generate a CRL that includes the intermediate A cert's serial, and that is issued by the same issuer (with a
        # KU specified but no cRLSign bit)
        int_revoked_crl = _crl(
            serials=[int_a_cert.serial_number],
            issuer_name=int_a_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_b_key,
        )
        int_revoked_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(
            int_revoked_crl_path, int_revoked_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force
        )

        # Providing a relevant CRL that includes the intermediate cert serial but was issued by a CA that has a KU
        # specified that doesn't include cRLSign should error indicating the CRL issuer can't sign CRLs.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=no_crl_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[int_revoked_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.CHAIN,
            policy=StatusRequirement.ALLOW_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error="IssuerNotCrlSigner",
        )

    def _ee_revoked_chain_depth() -> None:
        test_name = "ee_revoked_chain_depth"
        ee_cert = no_ku_chain[0][0]
        int_a_key = no_ku_chain[1][2]
        # Generate a CRL that includes the EE cert's serial, and that is issued by the same issuer (without any KU
        # specified).
        ee_revoked_crl = _crl(
            serials=[ee_cert.serial_number],
            issuer_name=ee_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
        )
        ee_revoked_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(ee_revoked_crl_path, ee_revoked_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force)

        # Providing a relevant CRL that includes the EE cert serial and verifies should error indicating the cert
        # was revoked when using the Chain revocation check depth (since it implies EndEntity).
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=no_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[ee_revoked_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.CHAIN,
            policy=StatusRequirement.ALLOW_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error="CertRevoked",
        )

    def _int_revoked_no_ku_chain_depth() -> None:
        test_name = "int_revoked_no_ku_chain_depth"
        int_a_cert = no_ku_chain[1][0]
        int_b_key = no_ku_chain[2][2]
        # Generate a CRL that includes the intermediate cert's serial, and that is issued by the same issuer
        # (without any KU specified).
        int_revoked_crl = _crl(
            serials=[int_a_cert.serial_number],
            issuer_name=int_a_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_b_key,
        )
        int_revoked_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(
            int_revoked_crl_path, int_revoked_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force
        )

        # Providing a relevant CRL that includes the intermediate cert serial and verifies, and using the
        # Chain depth should error since an intermediate cert is revoked.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=no_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[int_revoked_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.CHAIN,
            policy=StatusRequirement.ALLOW_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error="CertRevoked",
        )

    def _int_revoked_crl_ku_chain_depth() -> None:
        test_name = "int_revoked_crl_ku_chain_depth"
        int_a_cert = crl_ku_chain[1][0]
        int_b_key = crl_ku_chain[2][2]
        # Generate a CRL that includes the intermediate cert's serial, and that is issued by the same issuer (with a KU
        # specified that includes cRLSign).
        int_revoked_crl = _crl(
            serials=[int_a_cert.serial_number],
            issuer_name=int_a_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_b_key,
        )
        int_revoked_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(
            int_revoked_crl_path, int_revoked_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force
        )

        # Providing a relevant CRL that includes the EE cert serial and verifies should error indicating the cert
        # was revoked.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=crl_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[int_revoked_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.CHAIN,
            policy=StatusRequirement.ALLOW_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error="CertRevoked",
        )

    def _ee_with_top_bit_set_serial_revoked() -> None:
        test_name = "ee_with_top_bit_set_serial_revoked"
        ee_cert_topbit = crl_ku_chain[4][0]
        int_a_key = crl_ku_chain[1][2]

        ee_revoked_crl = _crl(
            serials=[ee_cert_topbit.serial_number],
            issuer_name=ee_cert_topbit.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
        )

        ee_revoked_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(ee_revoked_crl_path, ee_revoked_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force)

        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=crl_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[ee_revoked_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.CHAIN,
            policy=StatusRequirement.ALLOW_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            ee_topbit_serial=True,
            expected_error="CertRevoked",
        )

    def _ee_no_dp_crl_idp() -> None:
        test_name = "ee_no_dp_crl_idp"
        # Use a chain that has no CRL distribution point in each cert.
        ee_cert = no_ku_chain[0][0]
        int_a_key = no_ku_chain[1][2]
        # Generate a CRL that has a matching issuer, and an issuing distribution point.
        ee_idp_crl = _crl(
            serials=[0xFFFF],
            issuer_name=ee_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
            issuing_dp=valid_crl_idp,
        )
        ee_idp_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(ee_idp_crl_path, ee_idp_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force)

        # Checking revocation and not allowing unknown status shouldn't error - the CRL
        # is relevant because the certs have no DP.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=no_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[ee_idp_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.END_ENTITY,
            policy=StatusRequirement.FORBID_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error=None,
        )

    def _ee_not_revoked_crl_no_idp() -> None:
        test_name = "ee_not_revoked_crl_no_idp"
        # Use the chain that has a CRL distribution point in each cert.
        ee_cert = dp_chain[0][0]
        int_a_key = dp_chain[1][2]
        # Generate a CRL that has a matching issuer, but no issuing distribution point,
        # that does not include the ee cert's serial.
        ee_no_idp_crl = _crl(
            serials=[0xFFFF],
            issuer_name=ee_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
        )
        ee_no_idp_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(ee_no_idp_crl_path, ee_no_idp_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force)

        # Checking revocation and not allowing unknown status should be OK - the CRL
        # is considered to have a scope of "everything" since it does not
        # explicitly set a scope with a CRL IDP extension.
        # See https://github.com/rustls/webpki/issues/228
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=dp_chain,
            crl_paths=[ee_no_idp_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.END_ENTITY,
            policy=StatusRequirement.FORBID_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error=None,
        )

    def _ee_revoked_crl_no_idp() -> None:
        test_name = "ee_revoked_crl_no_idp"
        # Use the chain that has a CRL distribution point in each cert.
        ee_cert = dp_chain[0][0]
        int_a_key = dp_chain[1][2]
        # Generate a CRL that has a matching issuer, but no issuing distribution point,
        # and that _does_ include the ee cert's serial.
        ee_no_idp_crl = _crl(
            serials=[ee_cert.serial_number],
            issuer_name=ee_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
        )
        ee_no_idp_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(ee_no_idp_crl_path, ee_no_idp_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force)

        # Checking revocation and not allowing unknown status should return a revoked
        # status - the CRL is considered to have a scope of "everything" since
        # it does not explicitly set a scope with a CRL IDP extension.
        # See https://github.com/rustls/webpki/issues/228
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=dp_chain,
            crl_paths=[ee_no_idp_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.END_ENTITY,
            policy=StatusRequirement.FORBID_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error="CertRevoked",
        )

    def _ee_crl_mismatched_idp_unknown_status() -> None:
        test_name = "ee_crl_mismatched_idp_unknown_status"
        # Use the chain that has a CRL distribution point in each cert.
        ee_cert = dp_chain[0][0]
        int_a_key = dp_chain[1][2]
        # Generate a CRL that has a matching issuer, but no matching issuing distribution point.
        ee_wrong_idp_crl = _crl(
            serials=[0xFFFF],
            issuer_name=ee_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
            issuing_dp=x509.IssuingDistributionPoint(
                full_name=[
                    x509.UniformResourceIdentifier("http://does.not.match.example.com")
                ],
                indirect_crl=False,
                relative_name=None,
                only_contains_attribute_certs=False,
                only_contains_ca_certs=False,
                only_contains_user_certs=False,
                only_some_reasons=None,
            ),
        )
        ee_wrong_idp_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(
            ee_wrong_idp_crl_path, ee_wrong_idp_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER), force
        )

        # Checking revocation and not allowing unknown status should error - the CRL
        # isn't relevant because its CRL IDP doesn't match the cert DP.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=dp_chain,
            crl_paths=[ee_wrong_idp_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.END_ENTITY,
            policy=StatusRequirement.FORBID_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error="UnknownRevocationStatus",
        )

    def _ee_indirect_dp_unknown_status() -> None:
        test_name = "ee_indirect_dp_unknown_status"
        indirect_dp_chain = _chain(
            chain_name="indirect_dp_chain",
            key_usage=None,
            cert_dps=x509.DistributionPoint(
                full_name=valid_cert_crl_dp.full_name,
                relative_name=None,
                reasons=None,
                crl_issuer=[x509.DNSName("indirect.example.com")],
            ),
        )
        # Use the chain that has an indirect CRL distribution point in each cert.
        ee_cert = indirect_dp_chain[0][0]
        int_a_key = indirect_dp_chain[1][2]
        # Generate a CRL that has a matching issuer, and an issuing distribution point
        # that would match if the DP wasn't for an indirect CRL.
        ee_indirect_dp_unknown_status_crl = _crl(
            serials=[0xFFFF],
            issuer_name=ee_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
            issuing_dp=x509.IssuingDistributionPoint(
                full_name=valid_cert_crl_dp.full_name,
                indirect_crl=False,
                relative_name=None,
                only_contains_attribute_certs=False,
                only_contains_ca_certs=False,
                only_contains_user_certs=False,
                only_some_reasons=None,
            ),
        )
        ee_indirect_dp_unknown_status_crl_path = os.path.join(
            output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der"
        )
        write_der(
            ee_indirect_dp_unknown_status_crl_path,
            ee_indirect_dp_unknown_status_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER),
            force,
        )

        # Checking revocation and not allowing unknown status should error - the CRL
        # isn't relevant because the cert DP requires an indirect CRL.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=indirect_dp_chain,
            crl_paths=[ee_indirect_dp_unknown_status_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.END_ENTITY,
            policy=StatusRequirement.FORBID_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error="UnknownRevocationStatus",
        )

    def _ee_reasons_dp_unknown_status() -> None:
        test_name = "ee_reasons_dp_unknown_status"
        reasons_dp_chain = _chain(
            chain_name="reasons_dp_chain",
            key_usage=None,
            cert_dps=x509.DistributionPoint(
                full_name=valid_cert_crl_dp.full_name,
                relative_name=None,
                reasons=frozenset([x509.ReasonFlags.key_compromise]),
                crl_issuer=None,
            ),
        )
        # Use the chain that has a CRL distribution point in each cert that indicates
        # sharding by revocation reason.
        ee_cert = reasons_dp_chain[0][0]
        int_a_key = reasons_dp_chain[1][2]
        # Generate a CRL that has a matching issuer, and an issuing distribution point
        # that would match if the DP wasn't for a reason-sharded CRL.
        ee_reasons_dp_unknown_status_crl = _crl(
            serials=[0xFFFF],
            issuer_name=ee_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
            issuing_dp=x509.IssuingDistributionPoint(
                full_name=valid_cert_crl_dp.full_name,
                indirect_crl=False,
                relative_name=None,
                only_contains_attribute_certs=False,
                only_contains_ca_certs=False,
                only_contains_user_certs=False,
                only_some_reasons=None,
            ),
        )
        ee_reasons_dp_unknown_status_crl_path = os.path.join(
            output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der"
        )
        write_der(
            ee_reasons_dp_unknown_status_crl_path,
            ee_reasons_dp_unknown_status_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER),
            force,
        )

        # Checking revocation and not allowing unknown status should error - the CRL
        # isn't relevant because the cert DP requires a CRL sharded by revocation reason.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=reasons_dp_chain,
            crl_paths=[ee_reasons_dp_unknown_status_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.END_ENTITY,
            policy=StatusRequirement.FORBID_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error="UnknownRevocationStatus",
        )

    def _ee_nofullname_dp_unknown_status() -> None:
        test_name = "ee_nofullname_dp_unknown_status"
        nofullname_dp_chain = _chain(
            chain_name="nofullname_dp_chain",
            key_usage=None,
            cert_dps=x509.DistributionPoint(
                full_name=None,
                relative_name=x509.RelativeDistinguishedName(
                    [x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, "example.com")]
                ),
                reasons=None,
                crl_issuer=None,
            ),
        )
        # Use the chain that has a CRL distribution point in each cert that has no full name.
        ee_cert = nofullname_dp_chain[0][0]
        int_a_key = nofullname_dp_chain[1][2]
        # Generate a CRL that has a matching issuer, and an issuing distribution point
        # that would match if the DP wasn't for a relative-name CRL issuer.
        ee_nofullname_dp_unknown_status_crl = _crl(
            serials=[0xFFFF],
            issuer_name=ee_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
            issuing_dp=x509.IssuingDistributionPoint(
                full_name=valid_cert_crl_dp.full_name,
                indirect_crl=False,
                relative_name=None,
                only_contains_attribute_certs=False,
                only_contains_ca_certs=False,
                only_contains_user_certs=False,
                only_some_reasons=None,
            ),
        )
        ee_nofullname_dp_unknown_status_crl_path = os.path.join(
            output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der"
        )
        write_der(
            ee_nofullname_dp_unknown_status_crl_path,
            ee_nofullname_dp_unknown_status_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER),
            force,
        )

        # Checking revocation and not allowing unknown status should error - the CRL
        # isn't relevant because the cert DP requires a CRL with a name relative to an issuer.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=nofullname_dp_chain,
            crl_paths=[ee_nofullname_dp_unknown_status_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.END_ENTITY,
            policy=StatusRequirement.FORBID_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error="UnknownRevocationStatus",
        )

    def _ee_dp_idp_match() -> None:
        test_name = "ee_dp_idp_match"
        # Use the chain that has a CRL distribution point in each cert.
        ee_cert = dp_chain[0][0]
        int_a_key = dp_chain[1][2]
        # Generate a CRL that has a matching issuer, and an issuing distribution point
        # that matches too.
        ee_dp_idp_match_crl = _crl(
            serials=[0xFFFF],
            issuer_name=ee_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
            issuing_dp=x509.IssuingDistributionPoint(
                full_name=valid_cert_crl_dp.full_name,
                indirect_crl=False,
                relative_name=None,
                only_contains_attribute_certs=False,
                only_contains_ca_certs=False,
                only_contains_user_certs=False,
                only_some_reasons=None,
            ),
        )
        ee_dp_idp_match_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(
            ee_dp_idp_match_crl_path,
            ee_dp_idp_match_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER),
            force,
        )

        # Checking revocation and not allowing unknown status shouldn't error - the CRL
        # covers the cert, and it isn't revoked.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=dp_chain,
            crl_paths=[ee_dp_idp_match_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.END_ENTITY,
            policy=StatusRequirement.FORBID_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error=None,
        )

    def _ee_dp_invalid() -> None:
        test_name = "ee_dp_invalid"
        bad_dp = x509.DistributionPoint(
            full_name=valid_cert_crl_dp.full_name,
            relative_name=None,
            reasons=frozenset([x509.ReasonFlags.key_compromise]),
            crl_issuer=None,
        )
        # The __init__ constructor forbids omitting the full_name, relative_name and full_issuer, so
        # patch it after construction to be in an invalid state.
        bad_dp._full_name = None
        invalid_dp_chain = _chain(
            chain_name="invalid_dp_chain",
            key_usage=None,
            cert_dps=bad_dp,
        )
        ee_cert = invalid_dp_chain[0][0]
        int_a_key = invalid_dp_chain[1][2]
        # Generate a CRL with an IDP extension.
        invalid_dp_chain_crl = _crl(
            serials=[0xFFFF],
            issuer_name=ee_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
            issuing_dp=valid_crl_idp,
        )
        invalid_dp_chain_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(
            invalid_dp_chain_crl_path,
            invalid_dp_chain_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER),
            force,
        )

        # Checking revocation should result in an unknown revocation status - the certificate DP is invalid
        # so we can't match it to any CRL IDP.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=invalid_dp_chain,
            crl_paths=[invalid_dp_chain_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.END_ENTITY,
            policy=StatusRequirement.FORBID_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error="UnknownRevocationStatus",
        )

    def _expired_crl_ignore_expiration() -> None:
        test_name = "expired_crl_ignore_expiration"
        ee_cert = no_ku_chain[0][0]
        int_a_key = no_ku_chain[1][2]
        # Generate an expired CRL that doesn't include the EE cert's serial, but that is issued by the same issuer.
        ee_not_revoked_crl = _crl(
            serials=[12345],  # Some serial that isn't the ee_cert.serial.
            issuer_name=ee_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
            not_after=datetime.datetime.utcfromtimestamp(0x1FEDF00D - 10),
        )
        ee_not_revoked_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(
            ee_not_revoked_crl_path,
            ee_not_revoked_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER),
            force,
        )

        # Providing a CRL that's expired should succeed if the expiration policy is set to ignore.
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=no_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[ee_not_revoked_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.CHAIN,
            policy=StatusRequirement.ALLOW_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.IGNORE,
            expected_error=None,
        )

    def _expired_crl_enforce_expiration() -> None:
        test_name = "expired_crl_enforce_expiration"
        ee_cert = no_ku_chain[0][0]
        int_a_key = no_ku_chain[1][2]
        # Generate an expired CRL that doesn't include the EE cert's serial, but that is issued by the same issuer.
        ee_not_revoked_crl = _crl(
            serials=[12345],  # Some serial that isn't the ee_cert.serial.
            issuer_name=ee_cert.issuer,
            issuer_key=int_a_key,
            not_after=datetime.datetime.utcfromtimestamp(0x1FEDF00D - 10),
        )
        ee_not_revoked_crl_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{test_name}.crl.der")
        write_der(
            ee_not_revoked_crl_path,
            ee_not_revoked_crl.public_bytes(Encoding.DER),
            force,
        )

        # Providing a CRL that's expired should error if the expiration policy is set to enforce.
        expected_error = """
        CrlExpired {
          time: UnixTime::since_unix_epoch(Duration::from_secs(0x1fed_f00d)),
          next_update: UnixTime::since_unix_epoch(Duration::from_secs(0x1fed_f00d - 10)),
        }
        """
        _revocation_test(
            test_name=test_name,
            chain=no_ku_chain,
            crl_paths=[ee_not_revoked_crl_path],
            depth=ChainDepth.CHAIN,
            policy=StatusRequirement.ALLOW_UNKNOWN,
            expiration=ExpirationPolicy.ENFORCE,
            expected_error=expected_error,
        )

    with trim_top("client_auth_revocation.rs") as output:
        _ee_no_crls_test()
        _no_relevant_crl_ee_depth_allow_unknown()
        _no_relevant_crl_ee_depth_forbid_unknown()
        _ee_not_revoked_ee_depth()
        _ee_not_revoked_chain_depth()
        _ee_revoked_badsig_ee_depth()
        _ee_revoked_wrong_ku_ee_depth()
        _ee_not_revoked_wrong_ku_ee_depth()
        _ee_revoked_no_ku_ee_depth()
        _ee_revoked_crl_ku_ee_depth()
        _no_crls_test_chain_depth()
        _no_relevant_crl_chain_depth_allow_unknown()
        _no_relevant_crl_chain_depth_forbid_unknown()
        _int_not_revoked_chain_depth_allow_unknown()
        _int_not_revoked_chain_depth_forbid_unknown()
        _int_revoked_badsig_chain_depth()
        _int_revoked_wrong_ku_chain_depth()
        _ee_revoked_chain_depth()
        _int_revoked_no_ku_chain_depth()
        _int_revoked_crl_ku_chain_depth()
        _ee_with_top_bit_set_serial_revoked()
        _ee_no_dp_crl_idp()
        _ee_not_revoked_crl_no_idp()
        _ee_revoked_crl_no_idp()
        _ee_crl_mismatched_idp_unknown_status()
        _ee_indirect_dp_unknown_status()
        _ee_reasons_dp_unknown_status()
        _ee_nofullname_dp_unknown_status()
        _ee_dp_idp_match()
        _ee_dp_invalid()
        _expired_crl_ignore_expiration()
        _expired_crl_enforce_expiration()


if __name__ == "__main__":
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
    parser.add_argument(
        "--tls-server-certs",
        action=argparse.BooleanOptionalAction,
        default=True,
        help="Generate TLS server certificate testcases",
    )
    parser.add_argument(
        "--signatures",
        action=argparse.BooleanOptionalAction,
        default=True,
        help="Generate signature testcases",
    )
    parser.add_argument(
        "--client-auth-revocation",
        action=argparse.BooleanOptionalAction,
        default=True,
        help="Generate client auth revocation testcases",
    )
    parser.add_argument(
        "--format",
        action=argparse.BooleanOptionalAction,
        default=True,
        help="Run cargo fmt post-generation",
    )
    parser.add_argument(
        "--test",
        action=argparse.BooleanOptionalAction,
        default=True,
        help="Run cargo test post-generation",
    )
    parser.add_argument(
        "--force",
        action=argparse.BooleanOptionalAction,
        default=False,
        help="Overwrite existing test keys/certs",
    )
    args = parser.parse_args()

    if args.tls_server_certs:
        tls_server_certs(args.force)
    if args.signatures:
        signatures(args.force)
    if args.client_auth_revocation:
        client_auth_revocation(args.force)

    if args.format:
        subprocess.run("cargo fmt", shell=True, check=True)
    if args.test:
        subprocess.run("cargo test", shell=True, check=True)
